1. On 8 June 2010 Employment Judge Tayler in a conspicuously careful and clear set of reasons ordered that issues of jurisdiction arising out of these provisions, and the question whether the complaints were out of time, should be considered at a pre-hearing review. That pre-hearing review came before Employment Judge Stewart. He concluded that there had been no application for registration made by the Claimant to the HPC. (She had written in 2009 to the Privy Council, which is responsible for some of the affairs of the HPC, saying that she could not proceed through the usual appeal route as she had not been able officially to apply for state registration as there was no pathway open to her - she sought to appeal, but did not contend she had made any application). It was common ground between the parties (see, e.g. paragraph 51) that the Claimant had never made an application to the HPC such as to receive a decision on it, or for there to be a failure to make a decision, either of which would be appealable. He took the view that sections 13 of the SDA, 12 of the RRA and Regulation 19 of the Age Regulations did not require that there should first be an application for registration before the action of the qualifying body could be rendered unlawful:

"They merely required a formulation of terms on which the qualifying body is prepared to confer registration. If those terms are discriminatory, then the qualifying body had acted unlawfully."

Since there had been no application, there could be no internal appeal to the Council, hence no onward appeal to the County Court, and hence no statutory provision to prevent a Tribunal having jurisdiction.

1. Employment Judge Stewart was asked to review his decision. He decided to do so, and reversed it. It is against that decision, reasons for which were dated 29 March 2011, that this appeal is brought.

1. He understood that he was being asked by counsel to accept that the HPC was required by Parliament (under Article 12 of the Health Professions Order 2001) to consider and set up a list of approved qualifications. He summarised his decision on this submission in paragraphs 10 and 11 of his Reasons:

"... The Respondent when it exercised its judgement as to the courses to be included in the list of approved courses was implementing the will of Parliament. If it implemented that will incorrectly, that is a matter upon which the Claimant might seek Judicial Review: it does not fall to an Employment Tribunal to declare that the Respondent has failed to discharge its function correctly or has been remiss in its interpretation of its remit from Parliament or that Parliament has failed to comply with the Directives from Europe. That is the province of the Administrative Court.

11. On the other hand, if the Respondent has implemented the will of Parliament correctly but the effect of that correct implementation is that the Claimant is treated less favourably than others in ways that might suggest unlawful discrimination on the grounds of age, gender or nationality, then the Respondent has a complete answer in pointing out that its actions were the embodiment of the will of Parliament and therefore must be lawful.

12. Therefore I was wrong to ignore the source of the Rules which the Respondent advised upon ..."

1. Before me neither party invited me to uphold the reasoning of Employment Judge Stewart. The Claimant has had representation from Mr Keen and Ms Sobiecki of counsel under the auspices of the Free Representation Unit to advance her arguments, whereas previously before the Judge she appeared in person. Mr Downs of counsel, who did not appear before Judge Stewart, appeared for the Respondent. Both parties produced arguments of high quality for which they are to be commended.

1. Each party, for its own purposes, contended there had been no actual application for registration by Doctor King. Although at one stage I had wondered whether what had happened, factually, might amount to an application within the meaning of the legislation (if not within HPC's own rules, there potentially being a distinction as to the meaning of "application" between those rules and the statute) neither party asked me to take this course, and I am content to resolve this case on the basis I do not do so. The utility of this judgment as a precedent may be limited as a result.

1. The skeleton originally submitted by Doctor King and answered by the Respondent was supplemented by a revised argument delivered only two days prior to the hearing. Though Mr Downs indicated he would have wished more time to deal with the issues raised, the case had gone on for so long (for various reasons) that he did not invite any adjournment. Doctor King submitted that the Judge appeared to be saying that the fact that the statutory regime required the HPC to draw up a list of approved qualifications meant that it was obliged by statute to indicate to the Claimant that she could not apply to it with any prospect of success. If so, this was no basis to decline jurisdiction. In Hampson v Department of Education and Science [1991] 1AC 171, the House of Lords held that statutory protection for acts of discrimination done "in pursuance of any instrument made under any enactment by a Minister of the Crown" only extended to acts carried out in the necessary performance of an express statutory obligation and did not extend to discretionary acts. In General Medical Counsel v Goba [1998] IRLR 425, the EAT had confirmed that "the act complained of in its doing and the way it was carried out must have been one which was reasonably necessary in order to comply with any condition or requirement of the statute or order". The fact that the HPC was obliged to consider qualifications under Article 12 did not excuse it of any discrimination so as to render the Claimant's case unarguable.

1. Mr Downs did not argue the contrary, and expressly accepted that he was not relying upon the statutory scheme as excusing discrimination and eliminating jurisdiction.

1. I agree with Mr Keen's submissions on this point. The list of approved qualifications was not laid down by statute. It was left to the choice of the HPC. The fact that it had to make a choice was prescribed by statute: but not the nature of the actual choice to be made. There is nothing inconsistent between a statutory regime requiring a choice to be made, and the discrimination statutes requiring that any such choice does not have a discriminatory effect. Accordingly, the Judge was plainly wrong.

1. However, it is necessary to consider whether, though wrong in his reasoning, the Judge was nonetheless right in the result as Mr Downs claims he was, and Mr Keen denies.

1. The principal focus of Mr Downs' argument was first that the Claimant sought to challenge the provisions of the Order under which the HPC operated: this was the way she had put her case as recorded by Judge Stewart. His principal argument orally, faced with the new skeleton argument on behalf of the Appellant, was to argue that section 63 of the 1975 Act (and cognate provisions in the 1976 Act and Age Regulations) provided that jurisdiction did not apply to a complaint in respect of which "an appeal ... may be brought ...". Thus the fact there could be no appeal, because there had been no application (the Claimant having been deterred, but not prevented from making one) was not relevant: for it was open to the Claimant to take the action which it was necessary to take to trigger such an appeal. She could, simply by making an application (as she had not done) provoke a response from the HPC. If the HPC refused the application, she had an appeal to Council, and if Council did not accept her appeal, onward to the County Court. The act of which she complained, therefore, was potentially subject to an appeal.

1. This was consistent with the scheme of the Act which was designed to ensure that discrimination (if it existed) was not left unremedied. But it also preserved the ability of a body charged with professional oversight to take a careful look within its own procedures at what was alleged. The County Court, on appeal to it, would have the advantage of a careful and considered approach by the statutory body charged with overseeing registration for entry to the profession. That was appropriate, whereas requiring the HPC to address arguments in the forum of an Employment Tribunal without there having been careful consideration of the issues internally within the HPC first was not. The purpose of excluding jurisdiction because of the presence of another appeal was because Parliament accepted that in the case of qualifying bodies another appeal route might well be more appropriate. Great damage might be done to this carefully established structure if parties were at liberty to proceed against a body such as the HPC where they had made no application for registration to it in the first place. Thus the scheme should be construed so as to provide that a Tribunal had no jurisdiction where it lay in the Claimant's own hands whether there was an appeal against any substantial injustice she felt she had suffered. The Claimant here could access an appeal merely by making an application. Not to make an application, when it was within her power to do so would be to side step the provisions which ensured that the appropriate route (appeal to Council, followed by County Court) was followed.

1. As Mr Downs submitted, there is a point preliminary to any question whether s. 63 of the 1975 Act, s. 54 of the 1976 Act, or Regulation 36 of the Age Regulation applies. It is whether there has been a complaint, which comes under section 13 (1) of the 1975 Act (or the corresponding provisions). It is trite that the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Acts and the Age Regulations do not outlaw sex, race, and age discrimination in whatever circumstances they occur. The circumstances in which such discrimination gives rise to a claim are carefully defined. For discrimination by a qualifying (or qualifications) body to be capable of a complaint to an Employment Tribunal it must come within the terms of section 13 (1).

1. Whether an indication in advance of any application such as that made by the HPC here, to the effect that a would-be applicant's qualifications would not be acceptable, is such an act depends on the way in which section 13 (1) is to be construed.

1. Sub-sections 13 (1) (a), (b), (c), form a coherent group. All deal with a situation where less than the benefits of full registration are conferred: (a) deals with conditional registration; (b) with a refusal of registration; and (c) with a withdrawal of registration. None deals with the process of application for registration, unless the words "in the terms on which it is prepared to confer on her that authorisation" comprehend the process of application. Although on a casual reading of the section, I had initially taken the words to include such a process, on any focussed consideration it is clear this is not the case. Neither as a matter of logic or language do the words cover either facilitating, or hindering the process of application. The 'terms' deal with the extent of enjoyment of the authorisation or qualification once conferred. Linguistically, the authorisation or qualification is to be provided "on terms". So viewed, it is plain that (coherent with the general pattern formed by 1(a), (b) and (c)) the "terms" are the terms applying to the qualification once granted - effectively, qualification subject to a condition.

1. Sub-section 13 (3) does not affect this interpretation.

1. That the words are used in this sense in s.13 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 is demonstrated by comparison with section 6. Section 6 (1) provides as follows:

"it is unlawful for a person, in relation to employment by him at an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against a woman -

(a) in the arrangements he makes for purpose of determining who should be offered that employment or

(b) in the terms in which he offers her that employment, or

(c) by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her that employment."

The words in (b) and (c) echo those in section 13 (1) (a) and (b) with only those alterations which are made necessary by the context. But a distinction is plainly drawn between "arrangements made for the purpose of determining" the offer of employment, and the concept of "terms on which employment is offered." The terms and conditions of employment, once offered and accepted, are distinct from the arrangements made for determining who should receive the offer. There is no sub-section in section 13 equivalent to section 6 (1) (a).

1. The position under the two other legislative provisions is identical.

1. Mr Downs took me to Koskinen v Council of Professions Supplementary to Medicine and the Privy Council [2005] EWCA Civ 363. An Employment Tribunal held it had no jurisdiction to hear complaints of race discrimination made against the Health Professions Council (sued in its former name). The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed an appeal. On further appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Council for Professions Supplementary to Medicine was held not to be a qualifying body of the kind mentioned in section 12 because the Council as such did not confer an authorisation or qualification. Though obiter (see paragraph 89 of the Judgment of Mummery LJ, with which Maurice Kay and Keene LJJ both agreed) the Court recognised that it was in a position to express a view on the other grounds which had been fully argued. The second point made to it by the Council for Professions Supplementary to Medicine had been that the acts complained of did not fall within the terms of section 12 (1) (a) or (b):

"(Counsel for the Council) contends that the acts complained of by Mr Koskinen do not fall within these provisions. They have simply informed him that his UK Diploma is not recognised as a qualification.

93 They have not said anything about the terms on which they were prepared to confer authorisation or qualification and they have not refused or deliberately omitted to grant his application, because the Council never actually received from him a relevant application ...

95 ... None of the acts of which he makes complaint are acts which are rendered unlawful by Section 12 (1). It may be that some other procedure was appropriate for him to follow in order to advance the complaints which he has made in these proceedings but we are only concerned with whether he can maintain a claim in the Tribunal under the 1976 Act.

96 In my view, (counsel for the Council) is right. What he has alleged is not rendered unlawful by Section 12"

1. Two matters follow. First, the natural reading of section 13 (and section 12 of the 1976 Act) as I see it is also that which appealed to Mummery LJ. Secondly, though this court is technically not bound by the decision (being obiter), since it is one with which the entire Court was in agreement, following argument, it is not merely to be regarded as persuasive but as highly so.

1. In the course of argument I referred the parties to British Judo Association v Petty [1981] ICR 660, a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal presided over by Browne-Wilkinson J (as he was). The passage at 664 D - G makes it plain that he, too, read the provisions in the same way as have I.

1. Given that the Claimant's substituted skeleton argument raised points which the Respondent wished time to consider, and given the prominence which the argument as to the scope of section 13 (and the commensurate provisions in the other legislation) adopted during the course of the argument, the parties wished to consider whether to make further submissions on paper. Those further submissions draw attention to the case of Virik v General Medical Council (1995) EAT/919/95, in which the Appeal Tribunal presided over by Tucker J said ".. the clear wording of the subsection.." (there the Race Relations Act, s.12) "..relates to terms imposed upon an authorization at the point that it is granted and does not relate to terms which are a precedent to it being granted.". That expresses succinctly the point I make at paragraphs 26-34 above, initially reached in ignorance of the Virik decision.

1. Mr Downs argues that the Claimant is in reality complaining about the likelihood of unlawful discrimination against her if and when she applied for registration. On that basis, an appeal (or proceedings in the nature of an appeal) could be brought by her, in respect of the subject matter of her claim, and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is thereby excluded by the statutory provision.

1. The Claimant seeks to meet these arguments by pointing to the fact that in other provisions the discrimination statutes allow for anticipated or likely discrimination (as in the provision that indirect discrimination is made out where a "..respondent applies or would apply, any provision, criterion or practice..." (emphasis added)). Thus the provision should be interpreted to permit the deterred applicant to proceed as if she were a disappointed applicant. She would interpret the phrase "terms on which (the HPC) is prepared to confer" the qualification as including, but not limited to, the requirement that the Claimant's degree be included on the list of degrees devised by the HPC as a necessary preliminary to acceptance of an application.

1. She submitted that Petty was of no assistance in understanding the scope of the phrase; Virik was a case in which there was little discussion of the meaning of the word "term", and the document which was alleged to be discriminatory in that case was titled "advice": it did not contain terms as such. Moreover, the interpretation which appealed to me (see above) did not take account of developments in Community Law, and the general acceptance of the principle of equality. European Directives aim to provide access to occupation and employment which is unfettered by discrimination. The domestic statutory provisions must be interpreted so as to permit the Claimant a remedy where otherwise her access to the labour market in her chosen profession would be hindered by indirect discrimination: given the proper approach to the construction of legislation (to interpret provisions to the fullest extent possible to achieve a result in harmony with European Directives and Regulations) the Acts and Age Regulations should be interpreted so that a person deterred from application by discrimination should be afforded a proper chance of a remedy.

1. I cannot accept the Claimant's arguments here. I reject her interpretation of "the terms on which.." (etc). The case law is consistent, and compelling. My reasoning, independent in origin of those authorities, is to the same effect. Comparison of the wording of (for example) ss. 6 and 13 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 confirms that the natural reading of the words was that which Parliament had in mind. The words are not capable of the meaning, in context, which Mr Keen and Ms Sobiecki would wish to attribute to them.

1. As to the argument that this natural meaning can and should be stretched to the extent necessary to accommodate principles of equal treatment derived from European Union provisions and decisions, I reject that too. Dr King's potential claim is in reality one of indirect discrimination. So far as indirect discrimination is concerned, justification of a particular provision, criterion or practice is permissible under law. Matters of proportionality come into play in determining justification, for the discriminatory effect of any such PCP must be no greater than is necessary to achieve the legitimate aim, corresponding to a real need of the undertaking, to which the PCP seeks to give effect. Ensuring a just result and best assessment of proportionality in the context of professional registration, where there is a public interest in ensuring that it is not conferred too lightly, nor maintained when it would not be desirable to do so, is better achieved by reference to the qualifications (or qualifying) body, which by reason of its structure and membership is ideally placed to evaluate the pros and cons of any restriction - in this case, the appropriateness of particular qualifications - than by proceeding to an employment tribunal without being informed what is the best assessment of the body directly charged with promoting the public interests in these respects. The judicial assessment of proportionality will have to balance such conclusion as properly drawn in respect of those interests on the one hand against the discriminatory effect of the provision, criterion or practice on the other, and to do so needs to be properly informed as to those interests and their weight. Accordingly, where there is an appeal provided for by legislation, as there is where there is an application made to the HPC, issues of discrimination may be adjudicated on in the first place by that body, and its decision (which will indicate its view of the proportionality of any restriction) open to review in the courts. The principle of equality is not offended by this. The Claimant, though factually deterred, is not legally prevented from applying to the HPC.

1. So much for section 13 (1) (a). Subsection 1(b) cannot apply, for there has been no application to refuse or "deliberately not grant".

1. The argument which Mr Downs described as "his best point" when invited just after the start of proceedings to respond to the appeal, resting on the word "may" in section 63, does not fall for consideration in the light of my conclusion that the act complained of (whatever one might think of its merits) does not fall within the scope of section 13, and hence it is unnecessary to consider the exclusion of jurisdiction, since jurisdiction has not been established in the first place.

1. Lest it be thought that the conclusion is a hard one against the Claimant, in circumstances which call for sympathy, she has the option of making an application to the HPC, which if it should refuse would give her the right of appeal applying the same legal principles as to discrimination as would an Employment Tribunal.

1. For the reasons set out above, the Employment Judge was in error of law in his approach. However, the conclusion to which he came, properly analysed, depended upon a construction of the relevant sections and regulation. The conclusion to which he came, though erroneously reasoned, was in the result plainly and unarguably right. For those reasons, this appeal must be dismissed.